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Felice Batlan and R.B. Bernstein
Symposium Editors

INTRODUCTION: THE MAKING OF A CANONICAL LEGAL
HISTORIAN
FELICE BATLAN* AND R. B. BERNSTEIN**
William E. Nelson is one of the most prolific of modern American le-
gal historians; his scholarship ranges from the early colonial period through 
the 1980s. Along with that of a handful of other legal historians of his gen-
eration, Nelson’s work has become part of the canon of legal history; 
whether or not we agree with him, we write in the wide shadow of his 
work. Nelson has framed many of the questions that legal historians ask 
and the methodologies that they use. Perhaps equally important, the NYU 
Legal History Colloquium, under his leadership and mentorship, has met 
on a weekly basis for over thirty years. Not only is it open to all who want 
to attend, but a tremendous number of legal historians, historians, law pro-
fessors, scholars, and students have spent time in the Colloquium and lis-
tened to Nelson’s sometimes gentle (and sometimes not so gentle) critiques 
of their work.
It would be easy for this symposium to become a festschrift—a rightly 
glorious celebration of Nelson’s many accomplishments—but it is not. 
Nelson, along with the editors of this volume, vigorously agreed that this 
symposium would examine and assess the large body of scholarship that 
Nelson has produced in his almost fifty years as a historian. We wanted the 
symposium’s authors to challenge themselves, us, Nelson, and their readers 
with such questions as: What is the long-term significance of Nelson’s 
work? What themes emerge from his scholarship? How has his work been 
foundational to U.S. legal history? How does it fit into the larger historiog-
raphy of legal history and of American history, and how might we under-
stand each of Nelson’s works as part of a larger synthetic, even holistic 
oeuvre?
We arranged the symposium so that one author would write about 
each of Nelson’s major books or articles, or about clusters of books or arti-
cles sharing major themes. As all editors assume when assembling a collec-
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** Lecturer in Political Science, Skadden Arps Honors Program in Legal Sudies, Colin Powell School 
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tion of writings, not every scholar invited to participate will accept, and we 
had a long list of exceptional potential participants. We could not, however, 
have been more wrong about the planning process. Evidencing scholars’ 
profound respect for Nelson and his work, every person whom we initially 
invited accepted immediately. Had time and space permitted, we could 
have doubled the number of participants. The authors whose articles appear 
in this volume are some of the leading scholars in the field, each possessing 
an expertise in the area on which he or she writes. Our authors also span 
generations, including renowned senior scholars as well as more junior 
scholars.
We gave the authors a great deal of leeway in terms of what they 
chose to focus on and how they addressed their assignments. Our only ca-
veat was that they think critically about Nelson’s work and say something 
new and generative. This, of course, is no easy task. A number of authors 
chose to write in the historiographical mode, situating Nelson’s writings 
within the literature of legal history and asking what scholarship and ideas 
influenced Nelson’s work and then how Nelson’s scholarship contributed 
to and shaped the agenda for later scholars. For example, David T. Konig 
views Nelson’s Americanization of the Common Law1 as heavily influ-
enced by a rich social science literature about the formation, success, lon-
gevity, and dissolution of different types of communities as well as a thick 
literature on New England colonial towns.2 Much of this literature had 
adopted a strong declension narrative. In part, Nelson’s genius was to take 
this scholarship, which primarily did not address law, and ask what role the 
law played in creating and maintaining such communities. Nelson conclud-
ed that the role of law became increasingly important as the homogeneous 
New England Puritan town disintegrated. Likewise, Gautham Rao histori-
cally situates Nelson’s The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-19003
and views it as providing an important bird’s-eye sketch of the growth of 
the nineteenth-century federal administrative state.4 Other scholars, he 
explains, have spent decades filling in and adding specificity and elabora-
tion to Nelson’s story.
1. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (Univ. of Georgia Press, 1994) (1975) [hereinafter 
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW].
2. David T. Konig, Americanization of the Common Law: The Intellectual Migration Meets the 
Great Migration, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 917 (2014). 
3. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1983).
4. Gautham Rao, William E. Nelson’s The Roots of American Bureaucracy and the Resuscita-
tion of the Early American State, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2014).
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Instead of looking at how Nelson’s work fits into past scholarship, 
Laurie Benton and Kathryn Walker show how Nelson’s four-volume histo-
ry of law in colonial America (of which volumes one and two have ap-
peared)5 resonates with a larger, newly emergent school of history that 
studies law and imperialism comparatively and in a global context.6 Such 
current scholarship looks for fluidity and dialogue not just between the 
metropole and the periphery but also between different peripheries. These 
newer works identify the intellectual, cultural, legal, and material currents 
that ran through and connected global imperial networks. Benton and 
Walker query how Nelson’s current and future scholarship might be part of 
this new school and subtly urge him further to think about, even theorize, 
the nexus of colonial relationships in the original thirteen colonies in a 
more global, even interactive, context.
As some of these articles are historiographical, others ask what school 
of twentieth-century jurisprudence Nelson’s work fits into and how we can 
historicize that question. That is, these scholars treat Nelson as a product of 
his time, education, experiences, mentors, colleagues, where he resided and 
worked, and the intellectual currents of the day. Framed slightly differently, 
these articles present a micro-case-study of how a successful scholar was 
produced in the mid-to-late twentieth century United States. For instance, 
Konig spends considerable time examining the intellectual influence that 
certain scholars and schools of thought exerted on Nelson’s mentors and 
then the influence of such mentors on Nelson’s early work on law and ideas 
of community in colonial New England. Likewise, Brad Snyder discusses 
Nelson’s scholarship on the role of Supreme Court clerks, Nelson’s own 
clerkship with Judge Edward Weinfeld and Justice Byron White, and his 
articles on Justice White and his biography of Judge Weinfeld.7 Snyder 
understands Nelson as rejecting the mid-century legal process school of 
thought while also maintaining a continued skepticism towards late twenti-
eth-century critical legal theory. Continuing the attempt to understand 
where Nelson’s work fits, Edward A. Purcell Jr. writes that Nelson has no 
patience with constitutional originalism, believing that constitutional deci-
5. 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND 
NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660 (2008); 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL 
AMERICA: THE MIDDLE COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS, 1660-1730 (2013). Two more volumes are 
projected.
6. Lauren Benton & Kathryn Walker, Law of the Empire: The Common Law in Colonial Ameri-
ca and the Problem of Legal Diversity, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2014).
7. Brad Snyder, Rejecting the Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson’s Scholarship on Judge 
Edward Weinfeld and Justice Byron White, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2014).
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sion-making always has been the product of a host of social, cultural, reli-
gious, political, and economic forces.8
Yet certain tensions emerge that may be due to Nelson being both a 
lawyer and a historian situated in a law school. For example, Nelson him-
self does not subscribe to the gospel of determining cases by looking at the 
original intent of the framers of the Constitution, but he does believe that 
showing how Justices historically attempted to situate the Supreme Court 
as standing outside politics produced a norm relevant to the modern world. 
But, for the historian who traffics in change and contingency, does the ear-
ly nineteenth century really tell us much about the late twentieth century? 
Paul Finkelman comments on the problem of this dual role of historian and 
jurisprude, finding the first two-thirds of Nelson’s prize-winning study, The 
Fourteenth Amendment, to be a carefully constructed work of history that 
deeply grounds the Fourteenth Amendment in its historical context.9 By 
contrast, Finkelman sees the last part of the book as less critical and the 
more doctrinal work of a lawyer seeking to justify some of the worst Su-
preme Court decisions from charges of racism and judicial indifference to 
the plight of free African-Americans following Reconstruction.10
Another thorny question emerging from these essays focuses on the 
relationship between politics and law in Nelson’s scholarship. How does 
Nelson conceptualize the difference, if any, between law and politics, and 
does he view law as having any autonomy from politics? Here lies the es-
sence of Nelson’s disagreement with critical legal theory—which, reduced 
to its most simplistic form, views law as inevitably bound to politics and 
sees both law and politics as driven by class interests and by the reproduc-
tion of various hierarchies. Several symposium authors point out that Nel-
son, writing as a historian, does not pretend that law and politics are 
actually separate. Rather, he understands that law and politics are inter-
twined and that law is an ideology produced by a host of societal under-
standings, including those of various interest groups driven by various self-
interests—economic and otherwise. Simultaneously, we find that, when 
Nelson addresses his normative deductions from the history that he writes, 
he asserts a distinction between law and politics. Mark McGarvie notes in 
his examination of Nelson’s scholarship on Chief Justice John Marshall 
and Marbury v. Madison that Nelson sees Marshall’s greatest legacy as his 
8. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Semi-Wonderful Town, Semi-Wonderful State: Bill Nelson’s New 
York, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1085 (2014). 
9. Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of 
Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019 (2014).
10. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); see infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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insistence that law should be removed from and separate from politics.11 In 
part, this belief leads Nelson to conclude that courts should not be involved 
in or respond to socially divisive issues on which a larger social consensus 
has not emerged. Such questions are political and therefore matters best left 
to the legislative and executive branches. At the same time, Nelson em-
braces a protected space for individual rights that courts must protect. Yet 
how does one distinguish a protected right from a social issue?
The symposium’s authors, including Nelson himself, recognize the 
centrality to Nelson’s methodology of his gathering and synthesizing vast 
amounts of archival material.12 However, it would be wrong to believe that 
Nelson does not also engage in creating meta-narratives. Both Edward A. 
Purcell Jr., writing on Nelson’s two books on twentieth century New 
York,13 and Gautham Rao14 point out that Nelson portrays and analyzes a 
changing complex social, legal, and political economy in both the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. These conditions and the ideologies that 
they generated created a series of fundamental contradictions that echoed 
across nineteenth and twentieth century America and, in part, remain with 
us today. Such conditions allowed for upward mobility while ensnarling 
people in a bureaucratic state that provided political stability and made the 
fundamental redistribution of wealth impossible. Likewise, Americans long 
had embraced the ideas of majoritarian consent, protection of individual 
rights, and some form of equality. Such ideals and the multiple contradic-
tions that they produced collided repeatedly and worked themselves out 
(and continue to do so) in the political and legal arena.
Two scholars surprisingly do not make more than fleeting appearances 
in the following articles, yet both played vital roles in the evolution of Bill 
Nelson’s scholarly career. The first is John Phillip Reid, who in decades of 
teaching and scholarship at NYU Law School encouraged Nelson’s devel-
oping interest in legal and constitutional history while also serving as a foil 
and gadfly in creative tension with Nelson, in particular in the meetings of 
the NYU Legal History Colloquium. Reid’s resolute commitment to inves-
tigating and elucidating law-mindedness as an American cultural value has 
helped to shape Nelson’s work on law within American culture and history. 
Reid’s equally resolute commitment to stay firmly before the twentieth 
11. Mark McGarvie, That Elusive Consensus: The Historiographic Significance of William E. 
Nelson’s Works on Judicial Review, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 960-61 (2014).
12. William E. Nelson, Court Records as Sources for Historical Writing, in LAW IN COLONIAL 
MASSACHUSETTS 1630-1800, 62 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS 499-
518 (Daniel R. Coquillette ed., 1984).
13. Purcell, Jr., supra note 8, at 1086-87. 
14. Rao, supra note 4, at 998-99.
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century in his scholarly endeavors resonates with his formidable skepticism 
about the rhetoric of transformation and Americanization in the writing of 
American legal history—developments with which Nelson has been closely 
associated.
The second scholar is Morton J. Horwitz, who in the late 1970s joined 
with Nelson in writing influential monographs on the transformation or 
Americanization of law that drew Reid’s satirical ire. It is well-known that 
Horwitz was writing his The Transformation of American Law, 1780-
186015 at the same time that Nelson was completing his Americanization of 
the Common Law; The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society;
1760-1830.16 Indeed, for many scholars the appearance almost in tandem of 
Nelson’s and Horwitz’s books, and in the same influential series (Studies in 
Legal History), represented a seismic reshaping of the field of American 
legal history. And yet, the two scholars began to move in different direc-
tions that in retrospect were readily discernible in their major books’ differ-
ing visions of American legal history and American law. Whereas 
Horwitz’s version of that history stressed a self-conscious legal instrumen-
talism by which certain legal actors sought to shape law to advance their 
own interests at the expense of other sectors of American society, Nelson, 
by contrast, told a tale of the erosion of legal community under the influ-
ence of social, political, and military change brought by the American Rev-
olution. Their distinct methodologies, environments, and interests have 
through the years produced two very different legal historians.
A highlight of this symposium volume is Nelson’s essay.17 Although 
we expected that Nelson would want to write a short response, the essay 
that he produced is far more than that. Forever intellectually curious and 
productive, Nelson has taken the opportunity presented by this symposium 
to discern the meta-narratives in his own work and why and how he wrote 
what he did at particular moments in time. This reflective self-analysis 
beautifully synthesizes who Nelson is as a scholar and a person. Shining 
through Nelson’s response is his profound belief in the American ideals of 
liberty, freedom, equality, and individual rights. Although as a historian he 
is fully aware of how often the American state and Americans have failed 
to live up to these aspirations, he insists upon their importance—that they 
15. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (University 
Press, 1992) (1977); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: Making Legal History, in MAKING LEGAL 
HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON vii-ix (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R. B. Bernstein, 
eds., 2013)
16. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 1.
17. William E. Nelson, A Response: The Impact of War on Justice in the History of American 
Law, 89 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1109 (2014).
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are real, that they have content, that they are more than imaginary and fleet-
ing figments or convenient self-delusions and alibis.
Nelson emerges from his response as a pragmatist, an idealist, and an 
optimist. Underlying Nelson’s oeuvre is his belief in the possibility of 
American exceptionalism, in the very best sense of the word. For him, John 
Winthrop’s shining city upon a hill18 and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
mountaintop19 have remarkable moral force—not as places that ever exist-
ed in reality, but rather as ideals for which America and Americans might 
strive, no matter how many times they fail. Nelson’s idealism is marked by
pragmatism.20 Change has and will come, but it will do so slowly, reasona-
bly, rationally, and incrementally. Throughout Nelson’s scholarship, we see 
how law, courts, and the American political system have developed in ways 
that forestall radicalism and preclude utopian solutions. As Purcell writes, 
Nelson’s heroes are often those lawyers, judges, and reformers who seek to 
find a middle way between extremes. Time and time again in Nelson’s 
work, American society, whether in the colonial era or in New York of the 
1920s, flounders, but eventually is able to right itself. As Purcell points out, 
even when it looks as if all is doomed, Nelson is able to find the light—
things do get better.21
Occasionally Nelson does accentuate the positive, perhaps unduly so, 
in the view of some of his readers. Writing about the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Finkelman criticizes Nelson for his failure to recognize fully the 
catastrophic impact on African Americans of Supreme Court decisions of 
the 1870s and 1880s that interpreted narrowly the Fourteenth Amendment, 
or the invidious intent of those Justices who reached and wrote those deci-
sions. Finkelman writes that Nelson is “too kind” to the Supreme Court 
Justices who issued such decisions as the Slaughterhouse Cases and the 
Civil Rights Cases.22 So, too, Snyder sees Nelson as being too gentle in his 
work on his Supreme Court mentor, Justice Byron R. White.23 It is indeed 
18. Gov. John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity (1630 on board the Arbella),
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
19. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech in Memphis, TN: “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop”
(Apr. 3, 1968), http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/ive_been_to_
the_mountaintop/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2014)
20. In this view of exceptionalism, as a matter of opportunity and aspiration rather than of inher-
ent difference, Nelson resembles John Adams, who spelled out a pragmatic, opportunistic, and aspira-
tional vision of American exceptionalism in his 1776 pamphlet Thoughts on Government. John Adams, 
III. Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, FEBRUARY–AUGUST 1776, at 86–93 
(Robert J. Taylor ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1979) (1776), available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0026-0004.
21. Purcell, Jr., supra note 8, at 1106.
22. Finkelman, supra note 9, at 1024.
23. Snyder, supra note 7, at 1074-80.
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possible to read Nelson this way, and to conclude that his careful attention 
to doctrinal analysis might obscure or even eclipse the human consequenc-
es of the doctrines that he is analyzing, or the moral culpability of the Jus-
tices and judges who wrote those opinions and shaped or invoked those 
doctrines. And yet, perhaps, in an ironic reversal, Nelson might claim that 
he is following the counsel of the late, eminent radical historian E. P. 
Thompson, only for a significantly different class of historical thinkers and 
actors. Just as Thompson, in his classic 1963 study The Making of the Eng-
lish Working Class, sought “to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite 
cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even 
the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescen-
sion of posterity,” so, too, Nelson seeks to understand jurists who handed 
down opinions the substance of which has attracted the condescension and 
derision of posterity.24
We may well reach an illuminating understanding of Bill Nelson’s 
work as a whole if we view him, at least in part, as a consensus historian. 
Emerging during the first decade of the Cold War, consensus historians 
stressed societal agreement rather than conflict and argued that there was 
and is something that could be labeled American values. Mark McGarvie, 
who uses “consensus” in his article’s title, explains the consensus school of 
history, its various offshoots, and its influence on Nelson’s scholarship.25
Nelson’s form of consensus history is much more sophisticated than that 
offered by leading members of the consensus school. At the center of much 
of Nelson’s work is a careful examination of the role of consensus itself, 
how it is created, what happens on its erosion or evaporation, and how law 
is produced from, reaffirms, and defends consensus. David Konig points 
out in his discussion of Nelson’s earliest thesis on jury systems in colonial 
Massachusetts that the enormous discretion conferred on juries could occur 
only if there was significant societal consensus.26 By the outbreak of the 
American Revolution, such consensus evaporated and the law changed, 
shifting significant power in determining the outcome of cases from juries 
to judges. Consider Nelson’s observation on colonial New England law: 
24. E. P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 12 (1963). In an ironic 
twist, Thompson, in his 1978 study of the origins of the 1723 English statute known as the Black Act (1 
George I c. 22 [1723]), found, to his surprise, that the ideology of the rule of law actually meant some-
thing to the judges he was writing about, and deserved respect from a historian who ordinarily might 
have dismissed invocations of the rule of law as screens for the self-interest of the landed governing 
class. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 258-69 (1978). In this 
way, perhaps, Thompson’s attitude toward the judges he was examining parallels that brought by Bill
Nelson to the judges whom he was writing about.
25. McGarvie, supra note 11.
26. Konig, supra note 2, at 930.
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“Consensus was promoted by the fact that nearly all members of society 
shared common ethical values and imposed those values on the occasional 
individual who refused to abide by them voluntarily.”27
On a slightly different note, in his response to this symposium, Nelson 
sees war as a major theme in his work. War of course is the polar opposite 
of consensus. Yet, it appears that, for Nelson, certain wars—the American 
Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II—served to create new and 
more progressive, forms of national consensus. Nelson, as a person, is 
drawn to the idea of consensus, agreement, and social harmony, and signif-
icantly dislikes discord and conflict. This set of likes and dislikes is most 
noticeable in Nelson’s treatment of the late 1960s and early 1970s in The 
Legalist Reformation and his decision in that book barely to mention radi-
cal left-wing activity and revolutionary ferment and disorder.28 We can 
almost hear him wondering why there should ever be such discord, as rea-
sonable, rational people should be able to find common ground.
We hope that this symposium can be read in a multitude of ways. For 
some, it will be an introduction to William E. Nelson’s work. For others, it 
will provide an intellectual history of the growth and development of a 
canonical late twentieth-century legal historian. For still others, it will help 
to synthesize Nelson’s large body of scholarship in ways that illuminate the 
writing of legal and constitutional history and the shaping of a pivotal his-
torian and master of his craft who continues to surprise, enlighten, and 
challenge us.
27. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 1, at 4.
28. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY (2001).
